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Abstract 
 
We analyze the effects of the expansions of the European Union on inequality using an approach 
based on individuals' lifecycle incomes. This allows us to consider the effect of different rates of 
growth and survival rates. This differs form the usual analyses of inequality that focus on the 
evolution of current per capita income for the period.  Our results show that inequality in terms of 
permanent income was substantially less than in current per capita income at the time of all the 
expansions except those of the last ten years. The results point to the key role of policies that 
stimulate growth in the less developed countries. With an annual β-convergence of 2% in current 
income, inequality in permanent income would be one third lower. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*The authors wish to thank the Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia-FEDER (SEC2008-
03813/ECON) for their financial support. 
  1. Introduction 
 
With the entry of Rumania and Bulgaria in 2007 the European Union (EU) reached the figure of 27 
members and culminated, for the moment, a process of expansion begun half a century earlier when 
a group of six countries took the first steps in the project of European unity, from which substantial 
economic and social benefits were expected. The road travelled has not been without difficulties, 
but it is fair to acknowledge that the result of the successive expansions, always at the voluntary 
request of the candidate countries, shows that the advantages have clearly been greater than the 
possible disadvantages.  
 
The economic dimension of the project of European unity has been fundamental from the start. 
Indeed, the integration project has frequently been criticised for the “excessive” weight of economic 
aspects to the “detriment” of other matters. This is undoubtedly due in part to the substantial 
economic benefits that the countries expected (and still expect) to obtain in the long term as a 
consequence of the process of integration. At the present time these economic advantages 
associated with integration continue to be a constant incentive to progress along the path 
undertaken, in spite of the difficulties.1  
 
One of the reasons given to justify the benefits of economic integration is that the progressive 
expansion of the markets for goods, services and factors of production (capital and labour) will 
generate a greater and more efficient use of European countries' resources, stimulating the economic 
development of the area. Few doubt the long term advantages of economic integration for the 
member countries; however, the process of integration raises a series of questions that deserve an 
adequate response. In particular: 1) Do all member countries benefit equally? 2) Can the more 
developed countries better exploit the advantages of a wider market? Or, on the contrary, 3) Can the 
less developed countries, due to their lower labour costs, benefit to a greater extent from the entry 
of capital, foreign investment and the transfer of technology?  
 
 
                                                 
1 In fact, after the 2004 enlargement, in mid-2005, French and Dutch voters rejected the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe in national referendums, thus throwing into doubt the EU’s 
ability to work effectively and drive integration forward. At the same time, public scepticism about 
future enlargements began to mount and this opposition was indeed one of the reasons cited by 
Dutch and French opponents of the Constitutional Treaty. Many people in the “old” EU Member 
States think that the EU has not yet successfully digested the 2004 enlargement. They feel that the 
addition of the Central and Eastern European countries has changed the nature of the Union 
 Answering these questions implies analyzing the economic convergence of the member countries of 
the EU. The fundamental question is whether European integration gives rise to a pattern of growth 
that generates among the member countries convergence, greater differences, or has no appreciable 
effect in this regard. The analysis of this phenomenon is of special relevance since one of the 
explicit objectives of the EU is convergence among its countries and regions, and to this end it has 
devoted and intends to devote a large part of its budget through instruments such as the FEDER or 
the Cohesion Fund. 
 
The successive expansions, analyzed in greater detail later, have affected both countries already 
highly developed (e.g., United Kingdom, Denmark or Sweden) and others initially less developed 
(e.g. Ireland, Greece, Spain or the countries of Eastern Europe). Obviously, though perhaps for 
different reasons, both types of countries expect to benefit from joining the EU. 
 
At the empirical level there is little literature about the effects of the process of European 
integration on the convergence of the economies of the EU, and what there is not dedicated 
explicitly to the analysis of the repercussions of the process on inequality in per capita income of 
the member countries. Thus, a first group of studies are dedicated to analyzing the evolution of the 
economies in the fulfilment of the criteria for forming part of the Euro area (e.g. Guldager 1997 and 
Cappelen et al. 2003 and Ertur and Koch 2006). Another group of studies analyze convergence 
at regional level, rather than country level (e.g. Quah 1996), and in most cases do not refer to the 
explicit analysis of the effects of the process of European integration, but simply test for the 
existence of convergence among the economies analyzed. Finally, a third group of studies, though 
dedicated to the analysis of the convergence of countries, do not analyze the collective of EU 
countries, but study the individual experiences of countries, the countries of the OCDE as a whole, 
or all the economies of the world (e.g. Barro, Sala-i-Martin 1992, Shultz 1998, etc.). 
 
Most of these studies use measures of dispersion, such as the standard deviation of the logarithm of 
the variable (σ-convergence), or analysis of β-convergence so as to analyze the evolution of the 
income disparities among economies. However, regardless of the indicator used and the type of 
analysis of convergence, it should be pointed out that these studies are usually based on current per 
capita income. Although this methodology provides useful information, this approach could be 
enriched with a methodology that also takes into account the whole life cycle dimension. Some 
recent studies have tried to consider this issue by the use of alternative measures. Dowrick et al. 
(2003) propose their own index based on consumption and life expectancy, avoiding arbitrary 
 weightings by means of the revealed preferences; Becker et al. (2001 and 2005) analyse inequality 
of welfare by giving an economic value to the gains achieved in terms of life expectancy; likewise 
Philipson and Soares (2001) propose and analyse the properties of a measure of total income (Full 
Income Measure of Human Development).  
 
In this study we aim to use an approach that is also different from the conventional one, though 
complementary to it. It is a type of approach similar to that proposed by Serrano (2006)2. The main 
characteristic of the method is that it considers the lifecycle income of individuals (present value of 
future income) and not only the income of a specific period. By using the present value (permanent 
income or lifecycle income) we continue to take into account the level of current income of the 
period, but we also value aspects such as the different life expectancies in each country and the 
different pace of future growth of per capita income (which may converge much, little or not at all). 
The idea is that to judge inequality it may be appropriate to consider their lives as a whole, using 
well known tools of economic analysis like permanent income or lifecycle income which are basic 
to the modern theory of consumption (Modigliani 1986, Friedman 1957, Modigliani, Brumberg 
1954). 
 
A country's entry into the EU is a structural change in its economy whose effects can only be valued 
from a long term perspective. For this reason, it is appropriate to use a lifecycle approach to analyze 
the effects of integration on the citizens' lifecycle income, and not only on the incomes of specific 
periods. 
  
The proposed approach enriches the traditional approach in that it considers that the different 
countries may grow at different rates, which will determine the future incomes of their inhabitants. 
It also allows us to consider different rates of survival of the individuals of each country, which 
influences the number of years during which incomes are generated, and therefore the total incomes 
that they will obtain in the course of their lifetime. Both aspects may have important implications 
when judging the degree of inequality of the EU economies and their evolution following the 
successive expansions.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews the positive effects on economic growth 
associated with integration and, briefly, the history of the process of European integration. Section 
three reviews the existing literature on European convergence. Section four presents the general 
                                                 
2 This approach has been used recently by Pastor and Serrano (2008). 
 formulation of the approach. Section five presents the data and the results regarding inequality 
among EU countries at different moments in time. Finally, the last section presents the main 
conclusions. 
 
 
2. The process of European integration: expected effects on economic growth  
 
The main economic objective of European integration is to increase the rate of growth of the 
incomes of the participating economies, of per capita income, and in the final instance, of the well-
being of their citizens.  The underlying idea is that the construction of a wider European economic 
and social area will benefit the participating economies. 
 
The sources of the potential benefits associated with integration are very diverse (Viner 1950). 
Thus, integration favours greater specialization and better use of the comparative advantages of the 
economies as well as permitting more extensive exploitation of economies of scale (Harris 1984, 
Gasiorek, Smith & Venables 1992, Francois, McDonald & Nordström 1994). Also, the opening-up 
of markets among the member countries (elimination of legal and customs barriers) increases 
competition, exerting further pressure to increase the efficiency of production (MacDonald 1994, 
Caves, Barton 1990) and countries can purchase raw materials and intermediate goods on better 
terms, with the consequent increase in productive efficiency (Lee 1992). Finally, changes in the 
quantity and quality of the factors of production used can also be expected, due to the greater 
mobility of the factors of production within the area and to increased technical progress (Maudos, 
Pastor & Serrano 1999).  
 
These potential advantages have been a continued stimulus towards an ever greater degree of 
integration among European countries. It has been a long and many-staged process whose ultimate 
outcome is the European Union of 27 members, and whose successive phases it would be 
appropriate to review before undertaking the empirical analysis. 
 
The European Union has its origin in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) founded in 
1951 and formed of six countries (France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, 
Belgium and Luxemburg). These six countries, signatories of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, were the 
founders of the European Economic Community (EEC), a much more ambitious project no longer 
limited to the coal and steel industries. This led to the total abolition of customs tariffs on industrial 
 products in 1968 and to the development of common policies (as in the case of agricultural and 
trade policies). 
 
The success of the project attracted new candidates and in 1973 the EEC expanded to nine members 
with the entry of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom. In the 1970s the EEC's field of action 
expanded with the development of social, environmental and regional policies , with the creation of 
the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) in 1975. 
 
In the 1980s the process of expansion continued. 1981 saw the entry of Greece and 1986 that of 
Spain and Portugal. This brought with it a greater role for regional policies, with greater budget 
allocations for the structural funds, with the aim of reducing the disparities of economic 
development among the twelve member countries.  With the signing in 1986 of the Single European 
Act the creation of a great single market was agreed, becoming reality in early 1993. At the end of 
1990 the reunification of Germany took place, so that the länder belonging to the former GDR 
came to form part of the EEC.  
 
In 1993 came into force the European Union treaty planning the creation of the Monetary Union   
for 1999, as well as setting in motion various institutional reforms and once again expanding the 
EU's field of action with common policies on citizenship, the common security and foreign policy 
(CSFP) and dispositions regarding homeland security. 
 
At the start of 1995 three other countries joined (Austria, Finland and Sweden), raising the total 
membership to 15. The single currency (the euro) was created on 1st January 1999, and twelve of 
the EU's fifteen member countries joined it (all except the United Kingdom, Denmark and Greece, 
though the latter country would join it in 2001). In 2002 this currency physically entered into 
circulation. 
 
In the mid-1990s the former people's democracies of the Soviet bloc knocked at the EU's door. As a 
consequence of the negotiations begun in the later years of that decade, in May 2004 there was a 
new expansion with the entry of ten new members (Malta, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). Finally in early 2007 there occurred 
what for the moment is the last expansion, with the entry of Rumania and Bulgaria into the 
European Union of 27 members. 
 
 The reduction of the differences in standard of living among the member states and among their 
different regions is one of the explicit objectives of the EU. Regional policy achieves this by 
transferring resources from the richest regions to the poorest ones, being an instrument of economic 
solidarity and a tool of economic integration. The joint result of the dynamic effects of EU entry 
combined with the action of the EU's regional policy, which it is intended to make more powerful 
and with more clearly defined targets after successive reforms of its operation, will translate into 
greater equality. The Commission itself pointed with satisfaction to the case of Ireland (currently 
with one of the highest per capita GDPs when at the time of its entry it barely reached 64% of the 
EU average) as an example of what can be achieved.  
 
The financial effort has been substantial. In the 2000-2006 period the structural funds dedicated to 
this purpose amounted to 213,000 million euros (one third of the EU's total spending in that period). 
For the period 2007-2013 the resources budgeted are approximately 308,000 million euros, or 36% 
of the total expenditure planned. 
 
 
3. Review of the literature on European convergence 
 
There is surprisingly little scientific literature about the effects of the European integration process 
on the convergence of the economies of the EU, particularly with regard to explicit analysis of the 
repercussions of the integration process itself on convergence and inequality in the per capita 
income of the economies of the member countries following the successive expansions of the EU. 
 
The small amount of empirical evidence available on the process of convergence in the European 
Union can be classified into three groups of studies. A first group, perhaps the most numerous, 
contains studies that in reality focus on the analysis of the criteria for entering and forming part of 
the euro zone. This type of studies analyze macroeconomic convergence in terms of public deficit, 
interest rates or inflation rate (e.g. Guldager 1997). Another considerable part of the literature 
analyzes convergence in per capita income but at regional level rather than by countries (e.g. Quah 
1996) and only sometimes directly linked with the process of European integration (e.g. Ertur, Koch 
2006). Finally, in a third group of studies, long term economic growth and the convergence of the 
countries of Europe considered as countries is habitually subsumed in wider collectives such as the 
OECD or the world as a whole (e.g. Barro, Sala-i-Martin 1992), or analyzed only for the case of 
individual experiences (recently, for example, the case of Austria in Stockhammer (2009)). 
  
The empirical literature on the countries of the European Union indicates that convergence is not 
steady over time. Various factors seem to act in opposing directions, some generating convergence 
and others divergence. Furthermore these factors seem to have different importance for different 
types of countries, so the effect of  integration can vary significantly among countries.  
 
Thus, the results obtained in Henrekson et al. (1997) suggest that European integration may affect  
not only static efficiency through changes in resource allocation, but also long term growth rates. 
Their basic result is a fairly robust association between European integration and growth. The 
growth effect would be of the order of 0.6-0.8 percentage points p.a. The results also suggest that 
technology transfer is the main mechanism through which EC and EFTA membership affect 
growth. 
 
Delgado-Rodriguez and Alvarez-Ayuso (2008) analyze the evolution of labour productivity among 
EU-15 countries over the period 1980-2001. Using β-convergence techniques they identify periods 
of non-significant convergence (1980–85 and 1993–96), as well as others of rapid and significant 
convergence (1986–92 and 1997–2001) in which less productive economies tend to grow faster 
than more productive economies. For the whole period results are not statistically significant. 
Physical and human capital accumulation appeared to be the main driving force behind the process. 
On the other hand, technological progress tended to contribute to divergence, although a change in 
the trend was observed at the end of the period. 
 
Maudos et al. (1999) analyze the evolution of the countries of the European Union and the impact 
on efficiency and productivity of the successive expansions during the period 1965-90. The results 
show that until 1990 integration was beneficial for all the participants. The countries that joined 
experienced substantial relative gains in efficiency, greater in all cases than those registered in the 
period prior to their entry. Also the growth rate of TFP in the founder countries received a positive 
impulse with each new expansion.  Kaitila (2004) analyzes both σ and β convergence and discusses 
the impact of EU membership. According to the results, the EU15 countries’ real per capita GDP 
levels, adjusted for purchasing power, converged in 1960–2001. Convergence occurred in two 
spells, in 1960–73 and 1986–2001, with an interim period of stagnation. Abiad et al (2007) stress 
that, due to increasing financial integration, capital in Europe has travelled “downhill” from rich to 
poor countries, and has done so with gathering strength. These inflows would have been associated 
with a significant acceleration of income convergence.  In Reza et al (2008) real convergence of the 
 ten new members' economies to the EU average income is tested by using quarterly real GDP per 
capita data from 1995 to 2005. Application of the unit root tests for testing absolute convergence 
and catching-up make it possible to conclude that the 10 new members of the EU in 2005 tend to 
converge towards the EU average income. 
 
In any case, these studies are dedicated to the analysis of convergence and inequality in current per 
capita income and/or labour productivity. However, the effects of European integration are long 
term, so it is natural to use also a lifecycle approach like that described in the next section. 
 
 
3. General formulation 
 
As we have already indicated, this paper analyzes inequality within the EU throughout its existence, 
using as the key variable the per capita permanent income or lifecycle income.  
 
The per capita permanent income 0( )iPI  of economy i at time 0 is the discounted value of the 
present and future per capita current income  ( )ity , taking into account the survival rate in each 
period. We define ( , - 1)iS t t  as the probability that a person who is alive in period t-1 will still be 
alive in period t. Thus, the permanent income at time 0 is defined as indicated in the following 
expression 
 
 
120
0
0
( , 1)
(1 )
it
i it
t
yPI S t t
r=
= −+∑  [1] 
 
in which we assume a common and constant interest rate, r, and that the maximum life of an 
individual is 120 years (an unrestrictive assumption). 
 
Analysis of inequality and convergence in permanent income provides an analytical framework 
permitting us to identify their determinants and their sources of possible convergence. A more 
formal analysis of this type of approximation and its relationship to theoretical models of growth is 
offered in Serrano (2006).  
 
The approach proposed is more complete than the traditional one because it permits the 
 consideration that countries grow at different rates and their individuals have different survival 
rates. All this influences (i) their inhabitants' capacity to obtain future incomes and (ii) the number 
of years during which such incomes can be generated. 
 
To illustrate the proposed approach let us imagine two EU countries. Currently country 1 has a 
lower per capita income than country 2. If country 1 grows at a faster rate than country 2, the 
income of country 1 will therefore be closer to that of country 2 in the future. If we were to measure 
inequality using not only current income, but all incomes obtained throughout the lifetime of 
individuals, the inequality would be less than that observed when we use only current income. A 
similar argument can be applied to the situation where the countries differ in their survival rates. If 
individuals have a higher rate of survival in country 2, which is richer, the number of years during 
which incomes are generated will be greater, and thus, ceteris paribus, their future flow of incomes 
will also be greater. If we measure inequality again using not only current income, but all the 
incomes that will be obtained throughout individuals’ lives, the inequality in this case will be 
greater than that observed when using only current income. 3 
 
Note that, ceteris paribus, according to expression [1], countries will have higher levels of 
permanent income:  
 
- the higher their initial per capita incomes 0( )iy , since the higher the initial income, the 
greater the future income flows ( )ity  given the rates of growth ( )ig , [ (1 ) ]
t
it io iy y g= + ; 
- the higher their rates of growth ( )ig , since the higher the rate of growth, the higher their 
future per capita incomes ( )ity  given the initial levels of per capita income 0( )iy , 
[ (1 ) ]tit io iy y g= + ; 
- the greater the survival rates, [ ( , - 1)]iS t t , since this will determine that incomes will be 
obtained for more years and that the present value of those income flows will increase; 
- the lower the rate of discount (r), since this increases the present value of future incomes. 
                                                 
3 Of course, although the approach proposed is more complete than the traditional one based on current 
income, the permanent income approach poses some problems: 1) It is not such a straightforward concept as 
current income and 2) a number of additional assumptions (on future current incomes, life expectancy and 
discount rates) are needed to estimate it. For these reasons, we do not think that permanent income supersedes 
current per capita income, which is a very useful and informative way to look at inequality issues. However, 
we do believe that permanent income is a complementary, useful and suitable way to look at inequality 
between economies because it tries to take into account whole life cycles of representative individuals. This 
approach, we hope, may provide us with additional insights on the problem. 
  
At empirical level, three factors will influence the inequality in permanent income: 
 
- the initial levels of per capita current income, 
- the per capita future income flows, 
- the survival rates of individuals. 
 
Bearing this in mind, in the next section we will consider different counterfactual scenarios to 
evaluate separately the role of each of these determining factors. This will enable us to value the 
effect of each of these factors on inequality and convergence in the EU. 
 
 
4. Data and results 
 
In this section we present the results regarding the inequality among EU countries at two moments 
in time, 1960 and 2005. The comparisons were always made using the United States as benchmark4. 
All the data are taken from World Bank Development Indicators 20065. A detailed discussion of 
how the survival rates were obtained can be found in the appendix. 
 
Table 1 offers the detailed data regarding life expectancies and per capita current incomes. Since 
we are interested in analyzing precisely the relative differences between countries, the data are 
shown relative to the USA. Additionally we present the relative positions of each country in terms 
of current and permanent per capita income in both periods. 
 
                                                 
4 Using the USA as the benchmark economy is habitual in international work. This allows us to avoid using 
any EU average which could be a problem given the changing composition of the EU over time. Furthermore, 
we avoid having to choose any specific European country. At the same time, we also obtain results on 
inequality within the EU as well as on the relative performance compared with the world leader economy. 
This has the additional advantage of using as a benchmark a country which is not directly affected by the 
European integration project. 
5 Cyprus and Luxembourg have been excluded because of information problems. 
 Table 1: Current income, permanent income and life expectancy in the EU countries. 
Benchmark country=100. 
Permanent income* 
  
Life 
Expectancy (years) 
Current 
 Per capita income  (Historical scenario)  
Year of 
EU 
Entry Country 1960 2005  1960 2005  1960 2005
1951 Belgium 100.9 101.9  52.7 62.2  61.9 74.5
1951 France 100.7 103.5 54.5 62.9 62.6 74.8
1951 Germany 99.7 101.4 63.2 64.3 64.0 67.6
1951 Italy 99.1 103.3 41.6 51.6 50.3 66.0
1951 The Netherlands 105.2 101.6 62.9 62.6 65.9 63.5
1973 Denmark 103.4 100.1 88.7 84.1 87.6 80.3
1973 Ireland 99.9 101.1 34.6 78.0 79.5 191.7
1973 United Kingdom 101.9 101.4 73.4 71.0 72.8 70.0
1981 Greece 98.7 102.0 21.6 32.9 32.1 51.7
1986 Portugal 90.9 100.0 15.8 27.4 24.5 48.7
1986 Spain 99.1 103.9 26.6 41.5 40.5 68.8
1995 Austria 98.3 102.3 53.6 67.1 64.8 86.0
1995 Finland 98.6 101.7 51.3 68.1 65.7 91.8
1995 Sweden 104.6 104.0 78.4 78.6 82.3 81.9
2004 Czech Republic 100.8 97.8 22.3 17.3 18.2 13.7
2004 Estonia 98.2 92.4 14.8 15.6 15.3 15.2
2004 Hungary 97.5 93.8 9.2 15.1 14.5 23.4
2004 Latvia 100.0 92.3 9.4 13.4 13.2 17.4
2004 Lithuania 100.1 92.9 17.6 12.9 13.4 9.2
2004 Malta 98.3 101.7 8.0 25.6 27.6 101.3
2004 Poland 97.0 96.2 13.8 13.8 13.4 13.4
2004 Slovak Republic 100.7 95.5 14.8 12.7 13.0 10.6
2004 Slovenia 98.2 98.9 24.3 30.3 29.2 37.2
2007 Bulgaria 99.3 93.5 4.5 5.5 5.4 6.2
2007 Romania 93.8 92.1 5.8 6.0 5.6 5.7
- United States 100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0
Deviation coefficient         
  EU6 (1951) 0.024 0.010  0.161 0.085  0.101 0.074
 EU9 (1973) 0.021 0.011 0.292 0.152 0.170 0.500
 EU10 (1981) 0.021 0.010 0.371 0.235 0.252 0.509
 EU12 (1986) 0.036 0.013 0.469 0.309 0.336 0.499
 EU15 (1995) 0.035 0.013 0.420 0.278 0.302 0.430
 EU25 (2004) 0.029 0.038 0.670 0.583 0.596 0.699
  EU27 (2007) 0.030 0.042  0.735 0.653  0.666 0.770
* Permanent income calculated using individuals' rates of growth (gi), individual income per capita (yi) and individuals' survival rates 
(Si(t,0)). Discount rate = 2%. 
Source: World Bank and own preparation. 
 
 In respect of life expectancy at birth, the data show modest but significant differences. Thus, in 
1960 a country such as The Netherlands had a life expectancy 5.2% longer than the USA, while 
Portugal ranked 9.1% below that level. This is a substantial difference, of the order of 15%. Among 
the rest of the countries the differences were smaller but appreciable. In 2005 the greatest difference 
was between Sweden (4% above the USA) and Rumania (7.9% below the USA), a difference of 
12%.  There were significant changes during this period, such as the relative improvements of 
countries such as France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Austria and Finland; on the other hand in other 
cases the evolution was less satisfactory (The Netherlands, Denmark and nearly all the eastern 
European countries). These differences in terms of life expectancy and the changes occurring during 
the period make this an aspect to be taken into account when valuing the levels of inequality in the 
EU and convergence among countries from a long term perspective. 
 
In terms of per capita income the differences are of greater magnitude. In 1960 Denmark and 
Bulgaria were the extreme cases with per capita incomes equivalent respectively to 88.7% and 4.5% 
of the per capita income in the USA. In 2005 these two countries still showed the maximum and 
minimum values within the group of countries currently forming the EU27, Denmark with a per 
capita income of 84.1% that of the USA and Bulgaria barely reaching  5.5% . As well as the size of 
the differences, the changes occurring during the period should also be taken into account. The 
extreme values show a stability which it would be deceptive to consider something general. Thus, 
countries like Ireland, Belgium, Italy, Greece, Portugal, Austria, Finland, Hungary, Malta or 
Slovenia achieved substantial improvements in relative terms. Other countries like Denmark, The 
Netherlands, United Kingdom, Czech Republic or Sweden, however, presented a less satisfactory 
evolution. 
 
This disparity of behaviours over time makes it important when valuing the inequality among those 
countries at each moment in time to take into account not only the per capita incomes at that 
moment, but also the present value of the per capita incomes expected in the future. With such 
disparate growth rates of per capita income, inequality in terms of lifecycle income can vary 
significantly from inequality in income of the period. 
 
The estimations of per capita permanent income based on the “historical scenario” are offered in the 
third column of table 1.  In this scenario, according to expression [1], the initial per capita income 
and the survival rates have been used for each country. Also, we have used a long term growth rate 
based on the assumption that per capita income grows at the mean rate achieved during the period 
 1960-2005. Finally, to convert future incomes to present values we have used a discount rate of 2%. 
 
In 1960 permanent income varied between the value for Denmark (87.6% of the USA's) and that for 
Bulgaria (5.4% of the USA's). It would seem, therefore, that considering the lifecycle is not too 
important given that the results for both extreme cases are similar to those obtained using simply the 
current income for 1960. However, when we observe what happens in the other countries and not 
only in the extreme cases we see important changes. Though all the countries are below the USA, 
their relative positions change substantially if current income or permanent income is considered. 
Among others, Belgium, France, Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain, Austria, Finland, or especially 
Malta and Ireland, improve considerably when permanent income is considered6. Thus, for 
example, Ireland goes from 34.6% of the USA to 79.5%; Spain from 26.6% to 40.5%, or Italy from 
41.6% to 50.3%. On the other hand, there are countries such as the United Kingdom or Denmark 
where the opposite occurs and others where the improvement is unimportant (e.g. Germany, The 
Netherlands or Poland). In 2005 something similar occurs and it is easy to see that the ranking of 
countries would change considerably if permanent income were considered instead of current 
income. 
 
The above results show the existence of differences in terms of life expectancy and economic 
growth rates among European countries which justify the interest in adopting a permanent income 
approach to analyze inequality in the EU. Also, the estimations of permanent income indicate that 
the results can differ in many countries from those habitual in exercises based on current income. 
For this reason, we will analyze the evolution of inequality among countries within the EU 
throughout the period, and the possible changes associated with the various expansions thereof, 
with this lifecycle perspective always in mind. 
 
Our analysis of inequality in the EU will be based on the use of the coefficient of variation of per 
capita income, a dispersion statistic habitual in this type of inequality analysis. Figure 1 shows the 
level of inequality in different periods (including those years when expansions of the EU occurred) 
for the countries forming the EU at that time, both in terms of current income and of permanent 
income. Let us first examine the results in terms of current income. The coefficient of variation of 
current income of the EU6 was 0.161 in 1960. Following the entry in 1973 of Denmark, the United 
                                                 
6 The results for Malta and Ireland (both countries showing an estimated permanent income greater than the 
US in 2007) is due to applying the previous long run rate of growth in this scenario, which is very high in 
both countries. Recent developments show a less extraordinary performance. Other scenarios estimated in the 
paper allow for different hypotheses about future rates of growth. 
 Kingdom and Ireland the inequality increased to 0.254. In 1981, the year of Greece's entry, it was 
moderated to 0.249, growing substantially to 0.359 in 1986 (entry of Portugal and Spain). From 
then onwards there was a gradual descent, to 0.315 in 1990 (reunification of Germany) and 0.282 in 
2004 (expansion of the EU to 15). It has to be said that the effect of the most recent expansions has 
been a very significant increase of inequality among countries in the EU. In 2004 (expansion to 25 
member countries) the coefficient reached 0.591 and if we include Bulgaria and Rumania (which 
joined in 2007) the coefficient would be at levels around 0.653. 
 
Figure 1. Inequality in per capita current income and permanent income in the EU countries 
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In sum, we observe a progressive increase in inequality until the mid-1980s, a reduction over the 
next 20 years and a sharp rise as a consequence of the latest expansions towards Eastern Europe. 
The current levels of relative inequality, then, within this much more heterogeneous 27-member 
EU, multiply several times those existing among the original members of the project of European 
integration. 
 
Let us now consider inequality from a lifecycle perspective, using once again the coefficient of 
variation, but in this case that of permanent per capita income. The results appear in the same figure 
1. The temporal profile now shows a continued growth which, indeed, accelerates quite visibly with 
the latest expansions. Thus the coefficient starts at a level of 0.101 in 1960 (EU6), increases to 
0.141 in 1973, 0.168 in 1981, 0.218 in 1986, 0.236 in 1990, 0.258 in 1995, 0.702 in 2004 and 0.770 
 in 2005. Also when permanent income is used we observe that levels of inequality are at maximum 
values for the EU, much higher than the initial ones. 
 
 
When the results obtained from these two perspectives (current and permanent income) are 
compared, we observe some interesting differences. During the period prior to the latest expansion, 
inequality was much lower if permanent income is considered, especially for the years before 1995. 
That is to say, taking into account the future and not only the income of the period, the levels of 
inequality within the EU were substantially less than those indicated by the current per capita 
income of the period. However, after the latest expansions taking place this century the image is 
quite the contrary. Inequality is greater in terms of permanent per capita income. The differences of 
life expectancy and of incomes foreseeable in the future tend to magnify the inequality among the 
members of the present EU, whereas in the past the opposite occurred. This means that, unless 
European cohesion policies contribute more actively to changing this panorama, the levels of 
inequality in the EU will continue to be high.  
 
In this sense, it has to be pointed out that the latest reform of the EU's regional policy (European 
Commission 2004) motivated to a large extent by the latest expansions with the entry of more 
heterogeneous countries, is moving in the direction of concentrating its actions most on the 
unequivocally less developed areas. The aim of these reforms is to make the regional policy more 
effective in boosting the development of the less developed regions, essentially the majority of new 
member countries.  
 
Once we have analyzed inequality and convergence in permanent income (scenario 1 or historical 
scenario), our next step is to evaluate separately the role of each of their determining factors, such 
as survival rates, per capita current income and rate of convergence. In order to do this, the effect of 
each of them will be isolated step by step, i.e. allowing for changes only in one of these variables 
each time. These correspond to different assumptions as to survival rates, the initial levels of per 
capita current income and the existence or otherwise of convergence among countries in terms of 
per capita current income. On the basis of these scenarios, we simulate the inequality of permanent 
income of the countries by building some counterfactual scenarios. Particularly, the following 
scenarios will be considered: 
 
 - Scenario 1 (Historical base scenario): In this scenario it is considered that the per capita income 
of each economy in the initial period 0( )iy  grows at the individual average rate of growth ( )ig  
during the period 1960-2005. The series of per capita incomes ( )ity  obtained in this way 
[ (1 ) ]tit io iy y g= +  is used to calculate permanent income 0( )iPI  according to expression [2]. 
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- Scenario 2 (without convergence in current per capita income): In this scenario it is considered 
that the per capita income of each economy in the initial period 0( )iy  grows at the average rate 
of growth of the benchmark economy ( )USg  for the period 1960-2005. The series of per capita 
incomes ( )ity  obtained in this way [ (1 ) ]
t
it io USy y g= +  is used to calculate permanent income 
0( )iPI  according to expression [3]. 
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- Scenario 3 (Scenario with identical survival rates): This scenario is the same as scenario 1 with 
the sole exception that the per capita incomes of each economy ( )ity  obtained as described 
0[ (1 ) ]
t
it i iy y g= +  are combined with the survival rates of the benchmark economy ( )UStS , 
obtaining the permanent income 0( )iPI  according to expression [4]. In this way we can 
evaluate the differences in permanent income that would persist even if the survival rates did 
not differ between economies.  
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- Scenario 4 (Scenario of identical initial per capita incomes): In this scenario it is considered that 
the per capita income of each economy in the initial period is equal to that of the benchmark 
economy 0 0( )i USy y=  and grows at the individual average rate of growth ( )ig  during the period 
 1960-2005. The series of per capita incomes ( )ity  obtained in this way [ (1 ) ]
t
it USo ity y g= +  is 
used to calculate permanent income 0( )iPI  according to expression [5].  
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- Scenario 5 (considering the rates of growth since integration): In this scenario it is considered 
that the per capita income of each economy in the initial period 0( )iy  grows at the individual 
average rate of growth ( )POSTig  during the post-integration period to 2005. The series of per 
capita incomes ( )ity  obtained in this way [ (1 ) ]
POST t
it io iy y g= +  is used to calculate permanent 
income 0( )iPI  according to expression [6]. 
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- Scenario 6 (Scenario with convergence in current per capita income): In this scenario it is 
considered that the per capita income of each economy in each period ( )ity  converges towards 
that of the benchmark economy ( )USty  at a speed of convergence β. If we define the per capita 
income of an economy at moment t, relative to the benchmark economy, as t it USty yη =  and 
we further assume that there are no differences in steady state, then convergence at an annual 
rate of β makes ( )1 1tt oeβη η⎡ ⎤= − −⎣ ⎦  and ( )01 (1 ) tit USty y e βη −= ⋅ − − . The series of per 
capita incomes ( )ity  obtained in this way is used to calculate permanent income 0( )iPI  
according to expression [7]. In this scenario three rates of convergence are considered, β=2%, 
β=3% and β=5%. 
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Table 2 shows the coefficients of variation of permanent per capita income corresponding to these 
new counterfactual scenarios. 
 
 Table 2: Inequality in current income and permanent income in the EU countries. Different 
scenarios. (Deviation coefficient) 
 
Permanent income (Scenarios) 
  
Current 
income 
Scen. 1 
 
Scen. 2 
(gUSA) 
Scen. 3 
(SUSA) 
Scen. 4 
(YpcUSA)
Scen. 5
(gpost) 
Scen. 6  
( β=2%) 
Scen. 6  
(β =3%) 
Scen. 6 
(β =5%)
1960 EU6 0.161 0.101 0.175 0.089 0.075 0.101 0.075 0.060 0.045 
1973 EU9 0.254 0.141 0.263 0.140 0.360 0.241 0.112 0.085 0.058 
1981 EU10 0.249 0.168 0.251 0.182 0.338 0.440 0.099 0.074 0.048 
1986 EU12 0.359 0.218 0.358 0.228 0.313 0.772 0.129 0.093 0.059 
1990 EU12 0.315 0.236 0.313 0.248 0.312 0.851 0.115 0.083 0.053 
1995 EU15 0.282 0.258 0.281 0.267 0.294 1.078 0.106 0.077 0.049 
2004 EU25 0.591 0.702 0.603 0.695 0.507 2.699 0.209 0.157 0.109 
2005 EU27 0.653 0.770 0.667 0.761 0.499 2.850 0.223 0.167 0.116 
 
As we have shown above, one of the potentially important factors in determining permanent income 
is the future rate of growth of current per capita income. To estimate its impact on inequality we 
define scenario 2. In it we have obtained the permanent incomes of each country on the assumption 
of a common future growth rate. Specifically, the growth rate of per capita income  of the USA 
from 1960 to the present has been used for all countries. The initial levels of per capita income and 
life expectancies, on the other hand, continue to be those of each country. The results of scenario 2 
show increasing inequalities until the creation of the EU12, followed by slight reductions in the 
1990s and a sharp rise with the latest expansions. Of more interest is the comparison between these 
results and those of scenario 1, as the differences between the two indicate the part of the inequality 
in permanent income associated with the different long term growth rates of the current per capita 
income of each country. As can be observed, the different rates of growth of per capita income 
during the period 1960-2005 helped to reduce inequality, with the exception of 1960 and 2005. In 
the successive expansions from 1973 to 1995 we can observe that the inequality in permanent 
income of the historical scenario (scenario 1) is always less than that which would have been 
obtained with a common rate of growth. Thus, in 1986 the coefficient of variation of the EU12 
countries was  0.218, but applying the common growth rate (scenario 2) this coefficient would be 
0.313, indicating nearly 50% more inequality in permanent income. The reason is that, when the 
member countries of the EU9, EU10, EU12 and EU15 are considered as a whole, the countries with 
lowest per capita income showed faster long term growth during the period 1960-2005. However, 
the latest expansions again show differential characteristics. For the EU25 inequality stands at 0.702 
and for the EU27 at 0.77, according to scenario 1. Using a common growth rate the inequality falls 
to 0.603 and 0.667 respectively. This is because the latest expansions have brought in countries that 
are less developed and which have in the past shown less capacity for long term growth.  
  
The second important factor for explaining inequality among countries is the difference in life 
expectancy. Scenario 3 has been defined for the purpose of evaluating the importance that 
differences in life expectancy have had for the levels of inequality among the countries of the EU 
throughout its history. The results of this scenario were obtained under the assumption that all the 
countries had a common life expectancy, specifically that of the USA. Therefore, the differences 
between the inequality levels of this scenario 3 and those of scenario 1 (historical scenario) have to 
be attributed to the differences in life expectancy of each country. Thus, in 1960 the differences in 
life expectancy among the member countries of the EU6 explain a significant part of the inequality 
in permanent income (with a common life expectancy like that of the USA the coefficient of 
variation of permanent income would have been 0.089 instead of 0.101). On the other hand during 
the 80s and 90s the effect was the opposite, helping to reduce slightly the inequality in permanent 
income (thus, in 1995 the coefficient of variation among the countries of the EU-15 with a common 
life expectancy would have been 0.267 instead of 0.258). The impact of life expectancy is currently 
very low, and the levels of inequality would barely change even though the differences in life 
expectancy disappeared.  
 
Scenario 4 corresponds to the estimations of permanent income obtained by assuming that all the 
countries of the EU start with the same initial per capita income, but maintaining the life 
expectancies and long term growth rates of each country. In 1960 this gives an inequality of 
permanent income of 0.075, clearly below the inequality in current per capita income and also 
below the inequality observed in the historical scenario (scenario 1). This confirms that differences 
in life expectancy and, particularly, in growth rates, were contributing significantly to the inequality 
among the member countries of the original EU. From that moment onwards, the impact of these 
two factors becomes more and more substantial. Inequality in permanent income is greater than that 
obtained in scenario 1 in 1973, 1981, 1986 and 1995. With the latest expansion this trend has been 
broken since most of the new member countries present a substantial gap between their initial 
current per capita incomes and those of the existing member countries. The impact of growth rates 
and of differences in life expectancy is substantial (thus the inequality in scenario 4 rises from 0.294 
for the EU15 in 1995 to 0.507 for the EU25 in 2004), but the differences are smaller than in 
scenario 1 (thus, for the EU25 in 2004 inequality in permanent income is 0.507 in scenario 4 and 
0.702 in scenario 1). 
 
The evidence for the growth trajectories of the European countries after each expansion are not 
 especially encouraging. The results of scenario 5 were obtained by estimating in each year the 
future current incomes on the basis of the growth rates experienced by each country since that year. 
Let us recall that the estimations of scenario 1 are based always on the growth rates measured from 
1960 to the present. The comparison between scenario 5 and scenario 1 is clear. We can leave aside 
the result for 1960 which, naturally, has to coincide. In the rest of the years the inequality estimated 
in permanent income is significantly greater because post-expansion growths are used. This already 
occurs in 1973 (0.241 and 0.141) and the phenomenon persists with increasing intensity. In 1995 
the level of inequality would be multiplied by four (1.078 and 0.258) and with the latest expansion 
the result is similar (2.85 and 0.77). Naturally, we have to bear in mind that the more recent the year 
analyzed, the shorter the period that serves to calculate the growth rates, which may be subject more 
to immediate factors than to long term ones. In sum, the results indicate that if the current post-
integration growth rates are maintained, substantial levels of inequality will remain. 
 
Let us recall that the base estimation (scenario 1) was obtained from the rates of growth of per 
capita long term income (1960-2005) of each country in the past. A different pattern of growth in 
the future could have a substantial impact. In scenario 6 these growth rates have been replaced by 
others that correspond to a situation of convergence in per capita current incomes among the 
countries of Europe. Under this hypothesis the countries with lowest per capita income would grow 
most and would do so faster due to their relative backwardness. Three different annual convergence 
rates have been posited: 2%, 3% and 5%. These three convergence scenarios correspond to the 
hypothesis that each country manages to reduce the gap in current per capita income by 2%, 3% or 
5% (respectively) each year. 
 
The results indicate that this would lead to  a steep reduction of the inequality in permanent income 
among countries of the EU. The results of scenario 1 indicate that the inequality in permanent 
income in the EU is currently 0.77. However, if instead of maintaining the past growth rates of each 
country we assume that in the future there will be an annual convergence of 2%, the estimated 
inequality in permanent income would currently be only 0.223, less than one third. If a somewhat 
greater annual convergence in current per capita income (3%) were achieved, it would be only 
0.167. Finally, with a convergence rate of 5%, the inequality in permanent income would be barely 
0.116. 
 
In other words, if thanks to the process of economic integration itself or to the EU's cohesion 
policies, a convergence rate of 2% were achieved, the inequality in current income in 2005 of 0.653 
 would be compatible with a lifecycle inequality two thirds lower (0.223). 
 
It should be emphasized that rates of convergence between economies of 2% are perfectly feasible. 
Numerous studies have estimated similar convergence rates among the countries of the OCDE, the 
states of the USA, the prefectures of Japan, the regions of Germany, Spain, etc. (Barro, Sala-i-
Martin 1995). Furthermore, any increase in that rate of convergence would have its reward in an 
appreciable reduction of the inequality in permanent income.  
 
After analyzing the influence of the determinants of permanent income on inequality, we may 
wonder about the evolution of inequality following the successive expansions, both for the “old” 
member countries, and for the countries that are joining.  Table 3 permits us to observe the 
phenomenon of inequality in this multiple dimension, both in terms of current per capita income 
(panel a) and in terms of permanent per capita income under the scenario 1 (panel b).  
 
 Table 3: Inequality in current income and permanent income in the EU countries.  
(Deviation coefficient) 
 
a) Per capita income 
 1960 1973 1981 1986 1990 1995 2004 2005
EU6 (1951) 0.161 0.110 0.084 0.086 0.079 0.078 0.082 0.085
EU9 (1973) 0.292 0.254 0.196 0.222 0.168 0.151 0.143 0.152
EU10 (1981) 0.371 0.291 0.249 0.282 0.252 0.250 0.232 0.235
EU12 (1986) 0.469 0.353 0.329 0.359 0.317 0.316 0.306 0.309
EU12 (1990) 0.466 0.353 0.327 0.357 0.315 0.315 0.306 0.309
EU15 (1995) 0.420 0.320 0.299 0.324 0.289 0.282 0.274 0.278
EU25 (2004) 0.670 0.636 0.597 0.608 0.596 0.631 0.591 0.583
EU27 (2007) 0.735 0.702 0.661 0.671 0.663 0.699 0.661 0.653
       
b) Permanent income      
 1960 1973 1981 1986 1990 1995 2004 2005
EU6 (1951) 0.101 0.068 0.058 0.060 0.064 0.058 0.073 0.074
EU9 (1973) 0.170 0.141 0.143 0.136 0.182 0.251 0.490 0.500
EU10 (1981) 0.252 0.158 0.168 0.176 0.222 0.289 0.501 0.509
EU12 (1986) 0.336 0.199 0.210 0.218 0.236 0.294 0.490 0.499
EU12 (1990) 0.336 0.199 0.210 0.218 0.236 0.294 0.491 0.498
EU15 (1995) 0.302 0.187 0.198 0.209 0.218 0.258 0.424 0.430
EU25 (2004) 0.596 0.567 0.553 0.556 0.577 0.644 0.702 0.699
EU27 (2007) 0.666 0.640 0.624 0.626 0.650 0.717 0.773 0.770
 
 
The rows of the upper panel permit us to see the evolution of the inequality in current per capita 
income of the successive groups of countries that have come to form the EU throughout the period 
1960-2005. In the first row we can observe that the inequality among the founding countries at the 
start of the EU (EU6) decreased progressively from 0.161 to less than half that in 1995 (0.078), 
rising slightly thereafter (0.085 in 2005), though remaining well below the initial levels. For the 
expanded group of countries that formed the EU9 in 1973 something similar occurred, with 
inequality decreasing from 0.254 in 1973 to 0.152 in 2005. With the entry of Greece in 1981 the 
EU10 was formed, the reduction of inequality for this group being weaker (from 0.249 in 1981 to 
0.235 in 2005). More positive was the experience of the EU12 with the entry of Spain and Portugal 
in 1986: inequality was reduced from a level of 0.359 in that year to 0.309 in 2005. Slight 
reductions are also observed for the expanded collectives EU15 and EU25 as from their respective 
creations. That is to say that the general tone is one of the successive expansions being 
accompanied by reductions in the inequality among the “old” members. 
 
 Analysis of the columns of the table indicates that the inequality for the total of the countries of the 
EU would have increased as a consequence of the entry of new, more heterogeneous, countries. 
Thus, observing the levels of inequality in current per capita income in 2005 for the different 
subgroups (last column) we observe that it increases with the subgroup considered: 0.085 for the 
EU6, 0.152 for the EU9, 0.235 for the EU10, 0.309 for the EU12, 0.278 for the  EU15 (only 
exception, logical given the characteristics of the three new members), steep rise to 0.583 for the 
EU25 and 0.653 for the EU27 countries. 
 
The lower panel shows the results in terms of permanent per capita income. There are many 
similarities, but also some significant differences from the estimates in terms of current per capita 
income. Thus, observing the level of inequality in 2005 we can see that the various expansions have 
meant a clear increase in inequality for the EU, from the level of 0.074 for the founding countries 
(EU6) to levels of around 0.50 for the EU9, EU10 and EU12 and, finally, levels of 0.699 for the 
EU25 and 0.77 for the EU27. No increase in inequality is observed for 2005, when the EU9 
expanded to EU10 or EU12, something which did happen when current income was examined.   
 
If we now focus our attention on the impact of the successive expansions over time we will see that 
only in the case of the founding countries (EU6) do we observe a reduction of inequality in 
permanent income: the coefficient of inequality went from 0.101 in 1960 to 0.074 in 2005. For the  
rest of the groupings that have formed the EU at each time, the trend is the opposite; the EU9 
countries go from 0.141 in 1973 to 0.500 in 2005 ; the EU10 countries from 0.168 in 1981 to 0.509 
in 2005; the EU12 countries from 0.218 in 1986 to 0.499 in 2005 and the EU15 countries from 
0.258 in 1995 to 0.430 in 2005. The general tone is that the successive expansions have been 
accompanied by substantial increases in  inequality of permanent incomes among the “old” 
members, except in the case of the 6 founding countries.  
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
One of the basic objectives of the process of European integration is that the potential positive 
effects deriving from it should economically benefit all the member countries. In particular, the 
European Union's regional policy devotes a substantial part of the resources of the Union's budget 
for the purpose of reducing the economic inequalities in the territorial sphere. 
 
 The usual analyses of inequality focus on the evolution of the current per capita income of the 
period. Thus, when a fixed group of countries is analyzed over time (i.e. that formed by the 6 initial 
member countries or any of the groups that have come to form the area, EU9, EU12, EU15, etc.) a 
trend towards convergence in current per capita income can be appreciated between 1960 and 2005. 
When the analysis focuses on the changing group of countries that have formed the European Union 
over time, what we observe is an increasing level of inequality until the expansion of 1986, 
followed by an intense convergence until the latest expansions from 2004 onwards. On the other 
hand, the latest incorporations have led to the European Union having the highest levels of 
inequality among member countries of its entire history. 
 
In this study, we have adopted a complementary approach to the usual one to analyse the problem 
of inequality and convergence among the EU countries. This approach is connected with the 
permanent income and life-cycle theories. The main issue in these theories is the fact that they 
consider the complete flow of discounted future incomes. Regarding inequality, the results obtained 
with this permanent income approach may differ from those obtained when only differences in 
current income are used. The reason is that this approach takes into account the fact that countries 
may grow at different rates, which will determine the future incomes of their inhabitants. Moreover, 
if individuals do not have the same survival rates in different countries, the number of years during 
which the incomes are generated will be different. Therefore this will also affect the present value 
of the total sum of incomes that they will obtain throughout their lives. 
 
The results obtained indicate that inequality in terms of permanent income was substantially less 
than that shown by current per capita income for the European Union until the most recent 
processes of expansion. However, with the expansions of the last decade the opposite occurs. The 
inequality in current income currently underestimates the inequality in permanent income, a 
somewhat unsatisfactory situation. 
 
Nor does the temporal evolution of inequality in permanent income permit us to be too optimistic. 
Focussing the analysis on the fixed groups of countries that have formed the different European 
Unions we observe convergence until the mid-1980s and divergence from then onwards. On the 
other hand, the behaviour of the changing group of countries that have formed the European Union 
in the course of time shows an almost permanent tendency towards divergence. 
 
Differences in life expectancy would have helped to increase inequality in permanent income in the 
 initial phases of the European integration project. However, at present they have very little impact. 
The overall level of inequality would now be practically the same even if all the countries had the 
same life expectancy. 
 
The differences in the starting level of per capita current incomes are a more important factor than 
inequality in permanent income, though the sign of their effect varies in the course of the period 
analyzed. In the 1960s and also at the present time they contribute substantially to generating 
greater inequality in permanent income.  
 
Finally, we should point out the influence of the different economic growth rates of each country. 
This factor would have clearly contributed to reducing inequality in permanent income 
systematically since 1960. However, with the latest expansion its effect has been inverted and it 
becomes a source of greater inequality in permanent income. 
 
The analysis of the effects of the expansions on the different groups of countries indicates that the 
successive expansions have been accompanied by substantial increases of inequality in permanent 
income among the “old” members, except with regard to the case of the 6 founding countries. 
 
All these results point to the key role of economic growth in achieving further reductions in 
inequality in the EU, as the contribution of other variables such as life expectancy seems, at present, 
to be rather limited. Policies that stimulated greater growth of the least developed countries would 
have considerable effect. The simulations carried out show that with an annual convergence rate of 
2% (i.e. the countries reduce the gap existing in current per capita income by 2% every year), the 
inequality in permanent income would be less than one third of what it is now. This rate of 
convergence is ambitious, but not impossible, as it is consistent with that recorded by the countries 
of the OCDE in the past and with those habitually obtained when analyzing convergence among the 
regions of a single country. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Appendix: Construction of survival rates 
 
The survival rates for each age are not available for a large number of countries. To calculate them, 
in this study we use the same procedure as in Becker, Philipson and Soares (2001), based on the 
data offered by World Bank Development Indicators 2006. The procedure is based on four types of 
information available relating to survival rates 7: infant mortality 8 in the first year (S(1,0)), infant 
mortality in the first five years9 (S(5,0)), the survival rate at 60 years10 conditional on reaching 15 
(S(60,15)), and Life expectancy at birth (total years) (E0). Using this information, together with 
some simplifying assumptions, it is possible to construct the survival rates of 89 countries 
considered in the study for ages between 1 and 120 years. 
 
By definition we have the following relationships between the rates of survival 
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where E60 are the additional years of life for an individual of 60 years. 
 
The assumptions made with regard to the rates of survival are as follows: 
 
S(t,t-1) = S(t+1,t),  for 2 ≤ t ≤ 4; 
S(t,t-1) = 1,   for 6 ≤ t ≤ 15; 
S(t,t-1) = S(t+1,t), for 16 ≤ t ≤ 59; 
S(t,60) = e-(t-60)  for 60 ≤ t ≤ 120; 
S(t+1,t) = 0  for t>120 
 
Given the information available, this information is sufficient to reconstruct all the distribution of 
survival. This is done as follows: 
 
                                                 
7 The information provided by the WDI is presented as number of deaths (nij) per 1000 individuals, so it has 
had to be converted to rates S(i,j) using the following formula 
1000 ( , )
( , )
1000
n i j
S i j
−= . 
8 Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births). 
9  Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000 live births). 
10 Mortality rate, adult (per 1,000 adults). The information from the World Bank captures the mortality rate 
separately for men and women. In this study we consider the average.  
 where S(t,60) for t > 60 is obtained from S(t,60) = e-β(t-60) and β =
60
1
E
 (from the integration of 
S(t,60) of 60 to ∞). 
 
The assumptions adopted are not very far from the reality, and permit us to use the full 
potential of the information available. 
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